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ABSTRACT
We model the interaction of several radio devices aiming to
obtain wireless connectivity by using a set of base stations
(BS) as a non-cooperative game. Each radio device aims to
maximize its own spectral eﬃciency (SE) in two diﬀerent
scenarios: First, we let each player to use a unique BS (BS
selection) and second, we let them to simultaneously use
several BSs (BS Sharing). In both cases, we show that the
resulting game is an exact potential game. We found that
the BS selection game posses multiple Nash equilibria (NE)
while the BS sharing game posses a unique one. We provide
fully decentralized algorithms which always converge to a
NE in both games. We analyze the price of anarchy and
the price of stability for the case of BS selection. Finally,
we observed that depending on the number of transmitters,
the BS selection technique might provide a better global
performance (network spectral eﬃciency) than BS sharing,
which suggests the existence of a Braess type paradox.
General Terms
Game Theory, Potential Games, Base Station Selection, Base
Station Sharing, Self-Conﬁguring Networks, Braess Para-
dox.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider the case where several radio
devices aim to obtain wireless connectivity by using several
base stations (BS). Here, each device must strategically de-
termine the set of BSs to use, as well as the corresponding
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for proﬁt or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the ﬁrst page. To copy otherwise, or
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speciﬁc
permission and/or a fee.
Gamecomm 2009, October 23, 2009 - Pisa, Italy.
Copyright 2009 ICST 978-963-9799-70-7/00/0004 $5.00.
power level allocated to each BS to maximize its own spec-
tral eﬃciency in bps/Hz. In this context, we consider two
diﬀerent scenarios. First, we let each player to use a unique
BS (BS selection) and second, we let them to simultaneously
use several BSs (BS Sharing).
Note that if only one BS is considered, our model simpliﬁes
to a multiple access channel (MAC). Here, when all trans-
mitters access the BS using the same carrier, each device
uses its maximum transmit power. When, the BS is acces-
sible through out several carriers, each transmitter uses a
water-ﬁlling power allocation (PA) considering the observed
multiple access interference as background noise at each car-
rier [29]. In the ﬁrst case, such solution is Pareto optimal,
if and only if the sum of the achieved Shannon rates lies in
the convex hulk of the capacity region of the corresponding
MAC [10]. Generally, this condition may require certain co-
ordination between the transmitters, which can be achieved
by using pricing methods [1]. Conversely, in the second case,
the solution is always Pareto optimal [29]. In a more general
context, when there exists several BSs and regardless of the
performance metric, the model remains being a subject of
intensive research [3], [4], [12], [11], [24], [28].
Up to the knowledge of the authors, the state of art of
the BS sharing and BS selection scenarios is described by
the following contributions: [18], [3], [4], [24]. In [18], the
BS selection problem is investigated by considering that each
node is characterized by a ﬁxed single user spectral eﬃciency.
Here, the authors showed that based on the scheme of expo-
nential learning, players converge to an evolutionarily stable
equilibrium. Additionally, the authors showed that the price
of anarchy of such a game is unaﬀected by disparities in the
nodes’ characteristics. In [24], the authors studied the BS se-
lection scenario assuming that the transmitters aim to min-
imize their transmit power level required to achieve a target
signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR). Here, the in-
teraction between the radio devices is modeled as an atomic
and non-atomic potential game [19] to study the existence,
uniqueness and eﬃciency of the NE. Other contributions us-
ing potential games for radio resource allocation are [23, 27,16, 8, 9]. In [4], the non-atomic extension of the BS selection
game and the atomic extension of the BS sharing game are
investigated. Therein, the performance metric is the Shan-
non rate and channel realizations are considered identical
for all transmitters. Regardless of the possibly unrealistic
assumption, the authors of [4] identiﬁed the existence of at
least one NE in the non-atomic BS selection game and the
existence of a unique equilibrium in the atomic BS sharing
game. In [3], the authors study the BS selection and shar-
ing scenarios when the number of receivers is equal to the
number of transmitters and the performance metric is their
overall SINR, i.e., the sum of the SINRs obtained at each
BS. In this context, it is showed that when all players ob-
served the same channel realization (as in [4]), restricting
each player to choose only one BS produces a socially opti-
mal NE. Conversely, when the players are left free to share
their powers among several BSs, their utilities are strongly
decreased. This eﬀect is known as the Braess Paradox in the
frame of congestion games [6].
In this paper, we tackle the BS selection and BS Shar-
ing scenarios by modeling them as potential games. Con-
trary to previous works [24], we consider as performance
metric the spectral eﬃciency of each player and we let the
channel realization for each transmitter to be independently
drawn from a given probability distribution. In the former
case, we study both the atomic and non-atomic extensions
of the game. In the atomic case, we show the existence
of multiple NE and we use the best response dynamics to
provide fully distributed algorithms to achieve a NE. This
algorithm is proved to converge independently of the chan-
nel realization and the bandwidth allocated to each BS. We
measure the price of anarchy of this solution and we ob-
served that the performance of the fully decentralized solu-
tion (self-conﬁgured network) is close to that one obtained
when there exists a central controller (optimally conﬁgured
networks). In the non-atomic extension, we provide the op-
timal fractions of transmitter which must join each BS de-
pending on their available bandwidths. Regarding, the BS
sharing game, we show the existence of a unique NE. As in
the previous case, we provide a fully decentralized algorithm
which allows achieving a NE with probability one. Finally,
we compare both scenarios and identify that BS selection
performs better than BS sharing when there exists almost
the same number or more transmitters than BSs. As iden-
tiﬁed in [3], this observation constitutes a Braess type para-
dox, which implies that increasing the space of strategies of
each player, i.e., the number of BSs each player can use, ends
up degenerating the global performance of the network.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
Notation: In the sequel, matrices, vectors and scalars are
respectively denoted by boldface upper case symbols, bold-
face lower case symbols, and italic lower case symbols. The
transpose and Hermitian transpose of a vector x (matrix
X) is denoted by x
T and x
H (resp. X
T and X
H). The
sets of natural and real numbers are denoted by N and R,
respectively. Finite sets of natural numbers are denoted by
calligraphic upper case letters. Given two sets denoted by
A and B, their Cartesian product is denoted by A×B. The
cardinality of set A is denoted by |A|. The S-dimensional
vectors es, for all s ∈ {1,...,S} and S ∈ N, denotes a vec-
tor with zeros in all its entries except the s-th entry which
is unitary. The operator [x]
+, with x ∈ R, represents the
operation max(0,x).
Consider a set K = {1,...,K} of transmitters and a set of
S = {1,...,S} receivers, e.g., base stations (BS) or access
points (AP). Each transmitter can access the network by
using a (non-empty) set of BSs. Each BS operates in a spe-
ciﬁc frequency band and we neglect any type of interference
due to the adjacent bands (adjacent channel interference).
We denote the bandwidth associated with BS s ∈ S by Bs
and the total network bandwidth by B =
PS
s=1 Bs. Each
transmitter sends private messages only to its corresponding
BSs and it does not exist any kind of information exchange
between transmitters neither before nor during the whole
transmission. Both transmitters and BSs are equipped with
single antennas. Transmitter k ∈ K is able to simultaneously
transmit to all the BSs subject to a power constraint,
∀k ∈ K,
S X
s=1
pk,s 6 pk,max, (1)
where pk,s and pk,max respectively denote the transmit power
dedicated to BS s by transmitter k and its maximum to-
tal transmit power. Without any loss of generality, we as-
sume that all transmitters are limited by the same maximum
transmit power level, i.e., ∀k ∈ K, pk,max = pmax.
For all (k,s) ∈ K × S, we denote the channel coeﬃcients
between transmitter k and BS s by hk,s. Each channel co-
eﬃcient hk,s is a realization of a circularly symmetric com-
plex Gaussian random variable h with zero mean and unit
variance. We consider a slow fading channel, so that all
channel realizations remain constant during the transmis-
sion time. The baseband received signals sampled at sym-
bol rate at BS s, denoted by ys, can be written as a vector
y = (y1,...,yS)
T, such that
∀s ∈ S, ys = hsx
T
s + w. (2)
Here, for all (k,s) ∈ K × S, the K-dimensional vector hs =
(h1,s,...,hK,s). The K-dimensional vector xs = (x1,s,...,xK,s),
and xk,s represents the symbol sent by transmitter k to BS
s. The power allocation vector of transmitter k is the vector
(pk,1,...,pk,S), and pk,s = E
ˆ
xk,sx
∗
k,s
˜
represents the power
transmitted toward BS s by player k. The S-dimensional
vector w = (w1,...,wS), with ws ∼ N
`
0,σ
2
s
´
represents
the noise at the receivers. Here, σ
2
s = N0 Bs, where N0
denotes the noise spectral density.
The SINR of transmitter k at BS s is denoted by γk,s and
∀(k,s) ∈ K × S,
γk,s =
pk,sgk,s
ζk,s
, (3)
where, ζk,s = σ
2
s +
X
j∈K\k
pj,sgj,s represents the noise plus
multiple access interference (MAI) undergone by player k at
BS s and gk,s = |hk,s|
2 represents the channel gains. We
denote by Ks the set of transmitters using the BS s. Then,
we deﬁne two diﬀerent scenarios depending on the conditions
over the sets Ks for all s ∈ S. In the ﬁrst scenario, named
BS selection, each transmitter uses a unique BS. Thus, for
all s ∈ S, the sets Ks such that |Ks| > 0 form a partition
of the set K, i.e., ∀(j,k) ∈ S
2 and j  = k, Kj ∩ Kk = ∅and K1 ∪ ... ∪ KS = K. In the second scenario, named BS
Selection, a given transmitter is allowed to simultaneously
use several BSs. Thus, for all s ∈ S, the sets Ks form a cover
of the set K, i.e., ∀s ∈ S, Ks ⊆ K. In the following two
sections, we study both scenarios. Later, we compare their
performance by simulation results.
3. BASE STATION SELECTION GAMES
Assume that each transmitter can be modeled as a ra-
tional selﬁsh player and that such an assumption is com-
mon knowledge among all players. Then, the BS selection
scenario can be modeled by a non-cooperative game G1 de-
scribed by the tuple (K,(Pk)k∈K ,(uk)k∈K). Here, the set
of transmitters K is the set of players. The strategy of a
given player k ∈ K is its PA scheme, i.e., the S-dimensional
PA vector pk = (pk,1,...,pk,S) ∈ Pk, where Pk is the set
of all actions of player k (strategy set). Since each player
only transmits to a unique BS, its strategy set is deﬁned as
a ﬁnite set Pk,
Pk = {pk es : pk ∈ [0,pmax], ∀s ∈ S, es = (es,1,...,es,S)
and ∀r ∈ S \ s,es,r = 0, and es,s = 1}. (4)
Then, a strategy proﬁle of the game is a super vector
p = (p1,...,pK) ∈ P,
where P is a ﬁnite set obtained from the Cartesian product
of the strategy sets Pk, for all k ∈ K, i.e., P = P1×...×PK.
Let us denote by p−k any vector in the ﬁnite set P−k =
P1 × ... × Pk−1 × Pk+1 × ... × PK. For a given k ∈ K,
the vector denoted by p−k represents the strategies adopted
by all the players other than player k. The utility function
for player k, is deﬁned as uk : P → R+ and measures the
satisfaction of player k with respect to its chosen strategy
[21]. In this study, we deﬁne the utility function for all play-
ers as their spectral eﬃciency, i.e., the ratio between their
Shannon transmission rate and the available bandwidth B:
uk(pk,p−k,) =
X
s∈S
Bs
B
log2 (1 + γk,s), (5)
where γk,s is given by (Eq. 3) and p ∈ P.
In the sequel, we consider a ﬁnite number of transmitters
(players) such that each player is concerned with the strat-
egy (BS selection and transmit power allocation) adopted by
all the other players due to mutual interference. We name
this model: atomic BS selection game. In the second part,
we consider a high number of players such that each of them
is indiﬀerent to the strategy adopted by every single player.
In this case, each player is rather concerned with the frac-
tion of players adopting the same strategy. We name this
model non-atomic BS selection games.
3.1 Atomic BS Selection Games
In the atomic extension of the BS selection game G1, our
interest is to ﬁnd a strategy proﬁle p
∗ ∈ P such that no
player is interested in changing its own strategy. Once the
network conﬁguration p
∗ is reached, any unilateral devia-
tion of a given player decreases its own utility. A network
conﬁguration p
∗ is known as a Nash equilibrium [20].
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). In the strategic game
G1, a strategy proﬁle p ∈ P is an NE if it satisﬁes, for all
k ∈ K and for all p
′
k ∈ Pk, that
uk(pk,p−k) > uk(p
′
k,p−k). (6)
In the following, we analyze the existence, multiplicity and
determination of such strategy proﬁles.
3.1.1 Existence of at least one NE
Our ﬁrst step toward identifying the strategy proﬁles lead-
ing to a NE is to prove that there exists at least one NE for
any speciﬁc number of transmitters and BSs regardless of
the channel realizations. There exist several methodologies
for proving this [15]. In our case, we ﬁrst show that the
game G1 is a potential game (PG).
Definition 2 (Exact Potential Game). Any strate-
gic game G deﬁned by the tuple
`
K,(Pk)k∈K ,(uk)k∈K
´
is an
exact potential game (PG) if there exists a function φ(p)
for all p ∈ P such that for all players k ∈ K and for all
p
′
k ∈ Pk, it holds that
uk(pk,p−k) − uk(p
′
k,p−k) = φ(p) − φ(p
′), (7)
where p
′ =
`
p1,...,pk−1,p
′
k,pk+1,...,pK
´
.
Def. 2 together with Eq. (5) allow us to write the following
proposition:
Proposition 3. The strategic game G1 is an exact po-
tential game with potential function
φ(p) =
X
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
 
σ
2
s +
K X
k=1
pk,sgk,s
!
. (8)
Since the BS selection game G1 is a PG (Prop. 3), the
following proposition (Prop. 4) is an immediate consequence
of Corollary 2.2 in [19].
Proposition 4 (Existence of the NE). The BS se-
lection game G1 always has at least one NE in pure strategies.
3.1.2 Multiplicity of the NE
Once we have ensured the existence of at least one NE,
we determine whether there exists a unique NE or several
NE. As a ﬁrst step, we show that rational players always
transmit at the maximum power level pmax:
Proposition 5. In the BS selection game G1, all players
will always transmit at the maximum power independently
of the channel chosen to transmit.
Proof. The utility function of player k ∈ K transmitting
to a given BS s ∈ S is uk(pkes,p−k) = log2
“
1 +
pkgk,s
ζk,s
”
.
Then, since the logarithmic function is an increasing func-
tion, we have that ∀(k,s) ∈ K × S, and ∀pk ∈ [0,pmax],
uk(pkes,p−k) = log2(1+
pkgk,s
ζk,s ) 6 uk(pmaxes,p−k) = log2(1+
pmaxgk,s
ζk,s ). Hence, rational players will always use their max-
imum transmit power level.
Prop. 5 shows that the strategy set in (4) can be re-deﬁned
as follows
Pk = {pmax es : ∀s ∈ S, es = (es,1,...,es,S)
and ∀r ∈ S \ s,es,r = 0, and es,s = 1}. (9)The re-deﬁnition of the strategy sets Pk in Eq. (4) allows us
to study the multiplicity of the NE by using basic elements of
graph theory. First, let us index the elements of the strategy
set P by using the set I =
˘
1,...,S
K 
such that they are
ordered following the index i ∈ I. Denote by p
(i) the i-th
element of the strategy set P. Let us write each vector p
(i)
with i ∈ I, as a vector p
(i) =
“
p
(i)
1 ,...,p
(i)
K
”
, where for all
j ∈ K, p
(i)
j ∈ Pj. Second, consider that each of the strategy
proﬁles p
(i) with i ∈ I is represented by a vertex vi in a
given non-directed graph G. Each vertex is adjacent to the
K(S−1) vertices representing the strategy proﬁles obtained
by letting only one player to change its own strategy. Let
us denote by Vi the set of indices of the adjacent vertices of
vertex vi. More precisely, the graph G can be deﬁned by the
tuple G = (V,A), where the set V = {v1,...,vSK} contains
the S
K possible strategy proﬁles of the game and A is a
symmetric matrix (adjacency matrix of G) with dimensions
S
K × S
K and entries deﬁned as follows ∀(i,j) ∈ I
2 and
i  = j,
ai,j = aj,i =

1 if i ∈ Vj
0 otherwise , (10)
and ai,i = 0 for all i ∈ I. In the non-directed graph G,
we deﬁne the distance between vertices vi and vj, for all
(i,j) ∈ I
2 as the length of the shortest path between vi and
vj. Considering the structure of G, a more precise deﬁnition
can be formulated for the shortest path,
Definition 6. [Shortest Path] The distance (shortest path)
between vertices vi and vj, with (i,j) ∈ I
2 in a given non-
directed graph G = (V,A), denoted by di,j(G) ∈ N is:
di,j(G) = dj,i(G) =
K X
k=1
1n
p
(i)
k  =p
(j)
k
o. (11)
Note that the non-directed graph G satisﬁes the property:
∀(i,j) ∈ I
2, with i  = j, 1 6 di,j(G) 6 K. Thus, for a
speciﬁc number S of BSs and K transmitters, the maximum
number of NE which can be observed is obtained as follows:
Proposition 7. In a given BS selection game G1 where
the condition
∀(i,j) ∈ I, with i  = j, φ
“
p
(i)
”
 = φ
“
p
(j)
”
(12)
always holds, the maximum number of NE which can be ob-
served is S
K−1.
Proof. Assume that a given strategy proﬁle p
(i) (vertex
vi) with i ∈ I is a NE (Prop. 4). Then, given the condition
(12) it follows that none of the vertices in the set Vi is a
NE. Hence, two NE vertices must be separated by a min-
imum distance two in the non-directed graph G = (V,A).
Thus, we obtain the maximum number of NE by calculat-
ing the maximum number of vertices mutually separated
by minimum distance two in G. Given any two vertices
vi and vj, for all (i,j) ∈ I
2 with i  = j we have that
di,j(G) > 1. Then, the vertex vi and all the vertices vj
such that j ∈ Ji,k =
n
n ∈ I \ {i} : p
(n)
k  = p
(i)
k
o
, for any
k ∈ K, are separated by minimum distance di,j(G) > 2.
Then, for any (i,k) ∈ I × K, the set Ji,k has cardinal-
ity |Ji,k| = S
K−1 − 1. Then, the total number of points
p
(1) p
(2)
p
(3)
p
(4)
p
(5)
p
(6)
p
(7)
p
(8)
p
(1) p
(2)
p
(3)
p
(4)
p
(5)
p
(6)
p
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p
(8)
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Non-oriented graph and (b) oriented
graph representing the BS Selection game with K =
3, S = 2, under the condition φ(p
(2)) > φ(p
(6)) >
φ(p
(1)) > φ(p
(5)) > φ(p
(4)) > φ(p
(7)) > φ(p
(8)) > φ(p
(3)).
Total number of vertices: S
K = 8, number of neigh-
bors per vertex: K(S − 1) = 3. Maximum Number
of NE: S
K−1 = 4. Number of NE: 2 (red vertices in
(b)).
mutually separated by minimum distance 2 (including the
reference vertex vi) is |Ji,k| + 1 = S
K−1, which completes
the proof.
3.1.3 Determination of the NE
To evaluate the number of NE of the game G1 for a speciﬁc
set of channel gains, we use an oriented graph ˆ G =
“
V, ˆ A
”
,
where the adjacency matrix ˆ A is a non-symmetric square
matrix whose entries are ∀(i,j) ∈ I
2 and i  = j,
ˆ ai,j =
(
1 if i ∈ Vj and φ
“
p
(j)
”
> φ
“
p
(i)
”
0 otherwise ,
(13)
and ai,i = 0 for all i ∈ I.
In the graph ˆ G, we say that a given vertex vi is adjacent
to vertex vj, if and only if φ(pi) > φ(pj) and dij(G) =
1. Note that the condition for adjacency in ˆ G represents
the rationality assumption of players: A player changes its
strategy if the new strategy brings a higher utility function,
i.e., increases the potential function. In Fig. 1, we show an
example of the non-directed G and oriented ˆ G graphs for
the case where K = 3 and S = 2.
From the deﬁnition of the matrix ˆ A, we have that a neces-
sary and suﬃcient condition for a vertex vi to represent a NE
strategy proﬁle is to have a null out-degree: deg
+(vi) = 0
(sink vertex), in the oriented graph ˆ G. Hence, obtaining the
number of NE in the game G1 boils down to identifying all
the sinks in the oriented graph ˆ G. For doing so, it suﬃces
to identify the indices of the rows of matrix ˆ A containing
only zeros. If the i-th row of matrix ˆ A is a null vector,
then the strategy proﬁle p
(i) is a NE. However, building
the matrix ˆ A requires complete CSI, since it is necessary to
determine whether φ(p
(i)) > φ(p
(j)), φ(p
(i)) = φ(p
(j)) or
φ(p
(i)) < φ(p
(j)) for all i ∈ I and j ∈ Vi.
To determine a strategy proﬁle leading to a NE, in a dis-
tributed fashion with a less restrictive CSI at each radio
device, we introduce the following deﬁnition:
Definition 8 (Random Walks). A walk through an
oriented graph ˆ G is an ordered list of vertices vi1,...,viN
such that vertex vin+1 is adjacent to vertex vin, with in ∈ I
for all n ∈ {1,...,N}, and N 6 S
K. We say that a walkis random if given a vertex vin, the vertex vin+1 is chosen
randomly from the set Vin.
From Def. 8, we have the following result:
Proposition 9. Any random walk in the oriented graph
ˆ G ends in a vertex representing a NE.
Proof. Each step of the walk, i.e. the transition from
vertex vin to vin+1, can be interpreted as changing from
one strategy proﬁle p
(in), in ∈ I to another strategy proﬁle
p
(in+1), in+1 ∈ Vin such that φ(p
(in)) < φ(p
(in+1)). Since
there exists a ﬁnite number of vertices in the graph, it turns
out that any sequence φ(p
(i1)) < φ(p
(i2)) < ... < φ(p
(iN)),
with in ∈ I for all n ∈ {1,...,N}, is ﬁnite, i.e., N 6 S
K.
Moreover, the walk is ended if and only if the vertex vN does
not have any adjacent node, i.e., vertex vN is a sink vertex.
From the deﬁnition of the adjacency matrix ˆ A in Eq. (13)
it follows that any sink vertex represents a NE (Def. 1).
Thus, any random walk in the oriented graph ˆ G ends in a
NE. This completes the proof.
In practical terms, to perform a walk through the oriented
graph ˆ G implies imposing certain rules on each transmit-
ter of a given self-conﬁguring network: (a) A given player
changes its strategy if and only if the potential function can
be strictly increased. (b) Two or more players do not change
their strategy simultaneously. (c) All players have the same
chances to update their strategies. The ﬁrst condition de-
rives from the fact that each player aims to maximize its
own utility function. The second condition is to ensure that
each step in the random walk is equivalent to going from a
given vertex to one of its adjacent vertices. The third con-
dition is to ensure a random walk, i.e., to ensure that each
step is done with the same probability to any of the adja-
cent vertices. The last two conditions might require certain
synchronization system among the transmitters.
Algorithm 1 Base Station Selection Algorithm
Require: ∀k ∈ K,
MAI Vector: ζk(0) =
`
ζk,1(0),...,ζk,S(0)
´
Channel Realizations: gk = (gk,1,...,gk,S), ∀k ∈ K
t ← 0.
repeat
t ← t + 1
for k = 1 to K do
s ← argmax
i∈S
log2 (pmaxgk,s + ξk,s(t − 1))
pk(t) ← pmaxes
ζk(t) ← ζk(t − 1) + (pk(t) − pk(t − 1))g
T
k
until p(t) = p(t − 1)
Note that if the algorithm is implemented in a distributed
way, each player k ∈ K requires the knowledge of two pa-
rameters. First, the MAI level at each BS, i.e., the vector
ζ = (ζ1,...,ζS), where ζs = σ
2
s +
X
k∈K
pk,sgk,s and which is
common to all the players. Second, the channel realization
with respect to each BS, i.e., the vector gk = (gk,1,...,gk,S).
Each element of the vector ζ is obtained by feedback from
the corresponding BS at a frequency higher than the recip-
rocal of the channel coherence time. Each element of the
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Figure 2: Evolution of the potential at each update
of the players using the BS Selection Alg. 1. At
each step one player is randomly chosen to update
its strategy. All the sequences are obtained using
the same set of channel realizations hk,s, ∀(k,s) ∈
K × S. Number of players K = 5, Number of BSs
S = 3,
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B = 0.14,
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B = 0.40, and
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B = 0.46. SNR =
10log10
“
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N0B
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= 10 dB.
vector gk must be estimated by transmitter k using channel
estimation techniques, e.g., combining channel reciprocity
and training sequences in a two-way link. An important re-
mark regarding the proposed algorithm is that the NE where
a given walk ends, mainly depends on the starting vertex in
the graph ˆ G and the order we let each player to update its
strategy. Thus, if each player is randomly chosen for up-
dating at a given point of time, it is not possible to predict
the NE where a walk ends. Hence, this might lead us to
the situation where the convergence point is a non-optimal
NE regarding a global metric, e.g., the network spectral ef-
ﬁciency. We analyze the optimality issues in Sec. 3.3. In
Fig. 2 we show a walk through the directed graph ˆ G of a
given BS selection game with K = 5 and S = 2 and a given
set of channel realizations. The potential obtained at each
possible strategy proﬁle p
(i), i.e., φ
“
p
(i)
”
with i ∈ I is plot-
ted in Fig. 3 as a function of their index i. In Fig. 2, it can
be seen how diﬀerent walks end in diﬀerent NE.
3.2 Non-AtomicBaseStationSelectionGames
In the non-atomic BS selection game, we consider that
there exists a large number of players, such that players
are indiﬀerent to the strategy adopted by any single player.
Each player is rather concerned with simultaneous devia-
tions of fractions of the total number of players. Let us
denote by xs the fraction of players transmitting to BS s,
and assume that
∀s ∈ Sk, xs =
|Ks|
K
S X
i=1
xi = 1.
(14)
We denote the ratio between the available total bandwidth
B and the total number of transmitters K by α =
B
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the ratio between the available bandwidth at BS s and K,
denoted by αs =
Bs
K , satisﬁes
PS
s=1 αs = α. Using, these
notations, the potential function φ can be written as follows
φ(p) =
X
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
 
σ
2
s +
K X
k=1
pk,sgk,s
!
=
X
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
 
σ
2
s + pmax
X
k∈Ks
gk,s
!
=
X
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
0
B B
@K N0 αs + pmax
|Ks|
K |{z}
xs
K
|Ks|
X
k∈Ks
gk,s
1
C C
A
=
X
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
 
N0 αs + (xspmax)
1
|Ks|
X
k∈Ks
gk,s
!
+
X
s∈S
Bs
B
log2(K) (15)
Note that the term
X
s∈S
Bs
B
log2(K) does not depend on
the strategy of the players. Thus, following Lemma 2.7 in
[19], the function
˜ φ(p) =
X
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
 
N0 αs + (xspmax)
1
|Ks|
X
k∈Ks
gk,s
!
(16)
can be considered as another exact potential function of the
BS selection game G1. Now, we assume that the number
of players grows toward inﬁnity at the same rate that the
bandwidth available at each BS, i.e.,
• B −→ ∞ and K −→ ∞,
• lim
B,K→∞
B
K
= α < ∞, and
• ∀s ∈ S, lim
Bs,K→∞
Bs
K
= αs < ∞.
From a practical point of view, when the number of trans-
mitters grows toward inﬁnity while the total bandwidth or
number of BSs remain constant, the MAI becomes a dom-
inant parameter and thus, independently of the strategy
adopted by each player, their own utility function tends to
zero. Thus, no quality of service can be guaranteed, for in-
stance, in terms of minimum transmission rates. For avoid-
ing such a situation, we have considered that the number of
players grows to inﬁnity at the same rate as the total band-
width. This ensures that the utility function of each player
does not tend to zero when the load (number of transmitters
per BS) of the network is increased. Under these conditions,
it holds that for all s ∈ S, |Ks| → ∞, and thus:
1
|Ks|
X
k∈Ks
gk,s →
Z ∞
−∞
λdFg(λ) = Ω, (17)
where Fg is the cumulative probability function associated
with the probability density function fg of the random vari-
able g (channel gains) described in Sec. 2: dFg(λ) = f(λ)dλ.
This result allows us to write the function φ as a function
of the fractions x1,...,xS,
˜ φ(x1,...,xS) =
X
s∈S
αs
α
log2 (N0 αs + xspmaxΩ), (18)
and thus, ﬁnding a set of fractions such that no player is
interested to modify, i.e. a NE in the non-atomic extension
of the game G1 boils down to solve the following optimization
problem (OP) [26],
8
> > > <
> > > :
max
x1,...,xS∈R+
X
s∈S
αs
α
log2 (N0 αs + xspmaxΩ),
s.t.
S X
i=1
xi = 1 and ∀i ∈ S, xi > 0,
(19)
which has a unique solution of the form
∀s ∈ S, xs =
Bs
B
. (20)
In Fig. 4, we show the fractions xs, with s ∈ S, obtained by
Monte-Carlo simulations and using Eq. (20) for a network
with S = 6 BSs and K = 100 transmitters. Therein, it
becomes evident that Eq. (20) is a precise estimation of the
outcome of the non-atomic BS selection game. Note that if
all the BSs are allocated with the same bandwidth Bs =
B
S
∀s ∈ S, the fraction of players at each BS is identical, i.e.,
∀s ∈ S, xs =
1
S. This result is a generalization of the one
in [4], where similar fractions were obtained for the case
where each BS is allocated with the same bandwidth and
players observe the same channel gains, i.e., ∀(k,s) ∈ K×S,
gk,s = 1.
3.3 Efﬁciency of the Nash Equilibria
Here, we evaluate the performance of the network when
a completely decentralized stable conﬁguration is achieved
(Nash equilibrium) and the performance when there exists a
central controller that dictates a conﬁguration which max-
imizes a given global metric. In this study, we consider as
global metric, the sum of the utilities of each player, i.e.,
the network spectral eﬃciency. To carry out such a study1 2 3 4 5 6
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we consider two metrics known in the game theory jargon
as price of anarchy and price of stability [14]. We formally
deﬁne such parameters as follows:
Definition 10. In the strategic game
`
K,(Pk)k∈K ,(uk)k∈K
´
,
denote the set of NE strategy proﬁles by P
∗ ⊆ P. Then, the
price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) are
the ratios,
PoA =
max
p∈P
K X
k=1
uk(p)
min
p∈P∗
K X
k=1
uk(p)
, (21)
and
PoS =
max
p∈P
K X
k=1
uk(p)
max
p∈P∗
K X
k=1
uk(p)
, (22)
respectively.
The discrete nature of the strategy set of the players makes
obtaining a closed-form expression for both the PoA and
PoS, a very diﬃcult task. Thus, we evaluate both PoA and
PoS using Monte-Carlo simulations. For instance, in Fig 5,
we respectively plot the PoA and PoS for a network with
S ∈ {2,3} BSs, and K ∈ {1,...,9} players. Therein, we ob-
serve that the loss due to decentralization is minimum since
PoA −→ 1, when the number of players increase. Simi-
larly to the PoA, the PoS is also close to unity but diﬀerent
from the PoA. This implies that eﬀectively, the case where
several NE are observed, takes place often. As a conclud-
ing remark regarding the eﬃciency of NE, we state that
the self-conﬁguring nature of the network does not imply a
signiﬁcant loss of optimality, i.e., if the network were cen-
tralized by enforcing signaling protocols between all trans-
mitters and the diﬀerent BSs, the gain in network spectral
eﬃciency will not justify the increment of signaling traﬃc
due to the feedback of the optimal strategies.
3.4 Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies
For any player k ∈ K, let the vector qk = (qk,1,...,qk,S)
represent a discrete probability distribution over the set of
pure strategies Pk. Here, qk,s represents the probability of
player k transmitting to BS s. The mixed-strategy space of
player k is the standard simplex Qk:
Qk = {(qk,1,...,qk,s) ∈ R
S :
S X
s=1
qk,s = 1,
and ∀s ∈ S, qk,s > 0}, (23)
and the space of mixed-strategies is Q = Q1 × ... × QK.
Let s = (s1,...,sK) be a vector in the discrete set S
K.
Let us also index each element of the set S
K with the set ˘
1,...,S
K 
such that elements are ordered following the
index i ∈ {1,...,S
K}. Denote by s
(i) =
“
s
(i)
1 ,...,s
(i)
K
”
, the
i-th element of such a set S
K. Denote by p
(i)
−k, the vector
p
(i)
−k =
“
p
(i)
1 ,...,p
(i)
k−1,p
(i)
k+1,...,p
(i)
K
”
,
where for all j ∈ K, p
(i)
j = pmaxe
s
(i)
j
∈ Pj. In the mixed-
strategy extension of the BS selection game G1, the utility
function Uk(q), with q = (q1,...,qK) ∈ Q, is deﬁned as the
expected value of the corresponding pure strategy utilities
with respect to the probability distributions qk for all k ∈ K,
i.e.
Uk(qk,q−k) =
SK X
i=1
K Y
k=1
q
k,s
(i)
k
uk(p
(i)
k ,p
(i)
−k). (24)
Following Lemma 2.10 in [19], and since, the game G1 is an
exact PG (Prop. 3), we claim the existence of a potential
function in the mixed-strategy extension of G1. We denote
such a potential by ¯ φ(q),
¯ φ(q) =
SK X
i=1
K Y
k=1
q
k,s
(i)
k
φ(p
(i)), (25)
where q ∈ Q. From [20], we know that there always exists a
NE in mixed strategies for the game G1. Thus the following
OP must have at least one solution,
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
max
(qk,s)∀(k,s)∈K×S
SK X
i=1
K Y
k=1
q
k,s
(i)
k
φ(p
(i))
s.t. ∀k ∈ K,
S X
s=1
qs,k = 1,
∀(k,s) ∈ K × S, qs,k > 0.
(26)
However, the solution to the OP (26) might not be neces-
sarily a fully mixed strategy, i.e., a vector qk with more
than one entry diﬀerent from zero. Indeed, depending on
the channel realizations, it is possible that no NE in fully
mixed strategies is observed, i.e.,
∃(k,s) ∈ K × S : ∀q ∈ Q, Uk(es,q−k) > Uk(qk,q−k).
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.
For instance, consider the case when there exist two players
and two BSs, i.e., K = 2, and S = 2. Then, we obtain that
if there exists a pair (k,s) ∈ K × S, such that
gk,−s
gk,s
6
σ
2
−s
σ2
s + pmaxg−k,s
, (28)
the condition (27) always holds and thus, it does not exist
a NE in fully mixed strategies. Here, we denote by −s and
−k the element other than s and k, in the binary sets S
and K, respectively. Note that the non-existence of a NE in
fully mixed strategies does not mean that it does not exist
a NE in mixed strategies [20]. The existence of at least one
NE in pure strategies has been proved (Prop. 4) and a pure
strategy NE is also a (degenerated) mixed strategy NE.
There exists several algorithms to iteratively solve the OP
(26). Those algorithms are known in the domain of machine
learning theory as linear reward inaction and linear reward
penalty [25]. Several applications of those algorithms are
presented in [27, 22, 17]. Contrary to the algorithms pre-
sented in this paper, linear reward inaction and penalty al-
gorithms requires to set up some parameters to reﬁne the
convergence speed and the accuracy of the obtained prob-
ability distributions [25]. These parameters depend on the
channel realizations, which means that at each coherence
time such parameters must be re-adjusted by training.
4. BASE STATION SHARING GAMES
In this section, we consider the case where each player
can be associated with several BSs. Here, each player not
only selects its set of BSs but also the speciﬁc power level
to transmit to each of its BSs. We deﬁne this interaction
as a strategic game denoted by G2 = (K,(Pk)k∈K ,(uk)k∈K),
where the set K remains being the indices of each player as
in the previous section, P represents the space of strategies,
where P = P1 × ...PK and for all k ∈ K
Pk =
n
(pk,1,...,pk,S) ∈ R
S : ∀s ∈ S, pk,s > 0,
and
X
s∈S
pk,s 6 pmax
)
.
The utility function remains being the spectral eﬃciency of
each player as deﬁned by Eq. (5).
4.1 Existence and Uniqueness of the NE
To study the NE of the BS Sharing game G2, we ﬁrst
introduce the following proposition:
Proposition 11. The BS sharing game G2 is an exact
potential game with potential function φ(p) given by Eq. (8)
for all p ∈ P.
Prop. 11 leads us to the following result:
Proposition 12. In the strategic game G2 the strategy
proﬁle p
∗ = (p
∗
1,...,p
∗
K), with p
∗
k =
`
p
∗
k,1,...,p
∗
k,S
´
, where
for all (k,s) ∈ K × S,
p
∗
k,s =
»
Bs
B βk
−
ζk,s
gk,s
–+
, (29)
is the unique NE of the game. The constant βk for each
player k is set to satisfy the condition
S X
s=1
pk,s = pmax and
ζk,s represents the noise plus MAI overcome by player k at
BS s.
Proof. To prove the existence of at least one NE, we
use the fact that the BS sharing game G2 is a PG (Prop.
11). Then, following Corollary 2.2 in [19], the existence of
at least one NE is ensured. Thus, proving the uniqueness of
the NE ends up being equivalent to prove that the OP:
max
p∈P
X
s∈S
Bs
B
log2
 
σ
2
s +
X
j∈Ss
pj,sgj,s
!
(30)
posses a unique solution. Indeed, since the potential func-
tion φ is strictly concave on P and P is a simplex, and thus
convex, the Karush-Khun-Tucker (KKT) conditions are nec-
essary and suﬃcient conditions of optimality. Hence, we
write:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
∀(k,s) ∈ K × S,
Bs
B
“
gk,s
pk,sgk,s+ζk,s
”
− βk + νk = 0
∀k ∈ K, βk
 
S X
s=1
pk,s − pmax
!
= 0
∀(k,s) ∈ K × S, νkpk,s = 0,
(31)
The solution to the system of equations (31) is known to
be unique and achieved by using the water-ﬁlling algorithm
[10]. Such a solution is given by expression Eq. (29) where
βk is uniquely determined to satisfy the condition
S X
s=1
pk,s =
pmax, for all k ∈ K. This ends up the proof.
4.2 Determination of the NE
The NE of the BS sharing game G2 is fully determined
by Eq. (29). Here, we study a decentralized algorithm such
that the NE in Prop. 12 can be achieved by players in5 10 15 20 25 30
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Steps
P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
φ
 
 
Random Updates.
Maximum Potential
Round Robin Updates
Figure 6: Evolution of the potential at each update
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a decentralized fashion. First, consider that the strategy
space P is obtained from the Cartesian product of the closed
convex sets Pk, for all k ∈ K. Second, note that the solution
to the OP
max
x∈Pk
φ
`
p1,...,pk−1,x,pk+1,...,pK
´
(32)
for all k ∈ K and for all p−k ∈ P−k is unique and can be
determined by using the water-ﬁlling algorithm [10]. Thus,
the OP (30) can be solved iteratively by using a non-linear
Gauss-Seidel method. Denote by pk(t) the solution to pk at
iteration t, where t ∈ N and pk(t + 1) is given by
argmaxφ
`
p1(t + 1),...,pk−1(t + 1),pk(t),pk+1(t),...,pK(t)
´
.
Then, following Prop. 2.7.1 in [5], the convergence of the
sequence {pk(t)}t∈{1,...,N} for N >> 0 is ensured. Based on
this result, we introduce the algorithm Alg. 2 for the BS
sharing game:
Algorithm 2 Base Station Sharing Algorithm
Require: ∀k ∈ K,
MAI Vector: ζk(0) =
`
ζk,1(0),...,ζk,S(0)
´
Channel Realizations: gk = (gk,1,...,gk,S), ∀k ∈ K
t ← 0.
repeat
t ← t + 1
for k = 1 to K do
pk(t) ← argmax
pk∈Pk
X
s∈S
Bs
B
log2 (pk,sgk,s + ξk,s(t − 1))
ζk(t) ← ζk(t − 1) + (pk(t) − pk(t − 1))g
T
k
until p(t) = p(t − 1)
In Fig. 6 we show the convergence to the maximum of the
potential function φ using Alg. 2 for the case of a network
with K = 6 transmitters and S = 3 BSs. Therein, we show
both a round Robin and random updates. In both cases, the
convergence is achieved in very few iterations.
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we use algorithms Alg. 1 and Alg. 2 to
compare the global performance of the network when BS
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“
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10log10
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selection and BS sharing are used. We choose the network
spectral eﬃciency as the global performance metric, i.e., the
sum of the utilities of all players. In ﬁg. 7, we plot the
network spectral eﬃciency for a network with S ∈ {2,4,8}
BSs and K ∈ {2,...,60} transmitters assuming an SNR
of 10 dB for each player. We observe that when K < S
the BS sharing technique performs better than BS selection.
However, when K > S, the performance of the BS selection
is strongly superior to BS sharing. For a large number of
transmitters both techniques perform similarly.
Note that the strategy space of each player is bigger in the
BS sharing scenario. Thus, one can think that a better per-
formance is always obtained by using BS sharing than using
BS selection. Paradoxically, we have found that on the con-
trary, for nearly fully and fully loaded networks i.e., K ≃ S
and K > S, increasing the space of strategies of each player
produces a global loss of performance. A similar paradox is
observed in congestion games where adding extra capacity
to the network ends up reducing the overall performance [6].
A similar paradox to the one presented in this work is also
observed in [3, 7, 13, 2].
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have investigated the BS selection and BS sharing sce-
narios in the context of self-conﬁguring networks using a
non-cooperative model focusing on the spectral eﬃciency of
each transmitter. We have proved the existence of at least
one NE in both cases. In the BS sharing game a unique
NE is observed, whereas BS selection games might exhibit
several. We have provided fully decentralized algorithms
such that players can calculate their NE strategy based on
local information and the MAI observed at each BS. We
have observed that no signiﬁcant gain would be achieved by
introducing a central controller in the case of BS selection.
The self-conﬁgured network performs almost identical to theoptimally conﬁgured network.
Finally, we have identiﬁed that depending on the number
of transmitters BS selection might perform better than BS
sharing. This result implies a Braess type paradox, where
increasing the strategy space of each players produces a de-
generation of the global network spectral eﬃciency.
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